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Introduction to Essays from “The Question of 
Religious Freedom: From John Courtney Murray, SJ 
and Vatican II to the Present” 
The papers that follow were originally presented at a conference 
entitled “The Question of Religious Freedom: From John Courtney 
Murray, SJ and Vatican II to the Present,” which was held at Loyola 
University Chicago during Spring Semester 2018. Ambassador Miguel 
H. Díaz, the John Courtney Murray University Chair in Public Service at 
Loyola University Chicago, organized the conference, which gathered 
together several prominent contributors to the contemporary conversation 
about religious freedom from the worlds of law and religious studies. 
Professor Hille Haker, the Richard A. McCormick, SJ, Chair in Catholic 
Moral Theology, and the Department of Theology graciously agreed to 
join him as cosponsors of the conference. 
In recent times, religious freedom has reemerged as a key issue within 
the United States and around the world. This development has occurred 
in the context of now long-running culture wars, which recently have 
taken on new political salience. The reemergence of religious freedom as 
a key issue has been contentious and controversial, especially insofar as 
religious freedom has been seen to stand in competition with other 
fundamental human rights, and supporters of religious freedom have 
sometimes been perceived to rely on the principle of religious freedom as 
a sword rather than a shield. In the spirit of engaging these difficult 
questions with a view towards advancing the common good, the papers 
collected in this issue of the Loyola University Chicago Law Journal 
address the subject of religious freedom as it relates to issues of social 
polarization, peaceful coexistence, nondiscrimination, and the other 
components of the common good. 
Offering an introduction to these papers, Professor Miguel H. Díaz’s 
paper An Unfinished Project: John Courtney Murray, Religious 
Freedom, and Unresolved Tensions in Contemporary American Society, 
addresses the contribution that John Courtney Murray, SJ made to 
Dignitatis Humanae, the groundbreaking document on religious freedom 
that the Second Vatican Council issued in 1965. Murray, as is well 
known, was a leading Jesuit and public theologian who bridged 
contemporary Catholic faith with American democracy. Professor Díaz 
discusses Murray’s reasoned historical approach to what he termed the 
American consensus, highlights the place that individual conscience 
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occupies in Murray’s thought, and concludes with some observations on 
currently unresolved questions relating to religious freedom in the United 
States. Professor Díaz highlights “the unfinished nature of [Murray’s] 
project and the need to revisit the complexity of this fundamental 
constitutional right.” He argues that in light of recent developments 
related to what Latin American theologians have termed the irruption of 
the poor into history, any effort to advance religious freedom and achieve 
an American consensus in the service of public order must be done 
mindful of the option for and the rights of marginalized persons and 
communities. Such an emphasis, Professor Díaz suggests, can deepen 
Roman Catholic commitment to the advancement of religious freedom 
consistent with the evolution that Murray brought about, taking the 
Church from the position that “error has no rights” to one that affirms that 
“only people—not ideas—have rights.” 
Two questions frame Professor Robin W. Lovin’s paper Religious 
Freedom and Public Argument: John Courtney Murray on “The 
American Proposition”: Is it good? Is it politics? Building upon Murray’s 
argument that any American consensus fails as a matter of fact, but has 
the chance to succeed as a matter of “need,” Professor Lovin emphasizes 
the Augustinian idea that “all goods are ordered in relation to one another 
by the relation that all of them have to God, and the idea that over a 
lifetime of experience, people can develop a reasonable apprehension of 
what that order is.” Professor Lovin, however, readily admits that the 
question of what is good is not sufficient to address the current polarizing 
conversations surrounding the protection of religious freedom. Public 
consensus and issues of politics and public policy must be equally 
addressed. On the one hand, Professor Lovin argues that, “Religious 
activists sometimes seem to avoid questions about the details of policy 
by grounding their claims in biblical images and language, so that it 
becomes more and more difficult to distinguish their political program 
from an altar call.” On the other hand, Professor Lovin cautions: “In place 
of a theology that is overly political, we now have a politics that is quasi-
theological. Party programs have taken on a kind of ideological rigidity 
that makes them invulnerable to criticism or refinement.” 
In Prophesy, Public Theology, and Questions of Justice: Some Modest 
Reflections, Professor Barry Sullivan argues that while Murray was 
undoubtedly an important contributor to the work of Vatican II and the 
development of American public theology, his contribution may at times 
be overstated, partly because the contributions of other important voices 
are minimized and partly because some erroneously view Catholicism in 
overly monolithic terms, thereby overlooking the rich historical diversity 
of Catholic thought concerning political freedom and democracy. 
Professor Sullivan also questions the lacuna that exists in Murray’s 
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thought with respect to some of the most salient features of public life in 
the United States, especially the then-growing awareness of the 
immorality of racism and its fundamental inconsistency with principles 
of liberal democracy. Critiquing Murray’s seminal work, We Hold These 
Truths: Catholic Reflections of the American Proposition, Professor 
Sullivan argues that, “racism continued to be a central feature of ‘the 
American proposition.’ For that reason, it is difficult today to read 
Murray’s work without being struck by the virtual absence of any 
discussion of racial segregation, racial prejudice, or the practical 
exclusion of African Americans from meaningful participation in the 
political life of the country.” Given this seemingly inexplicable omission, 
Professor Sullivan suggests that we need to be mindful of the possibility 
that “public theology may have more in common with politics than with 
prophesy.” His paper invites a more inclusive reading of social injustice 
to sharpen moral judgments for the sake of fostering necessary and just 
legal change. 
In Religious Freedom, Human Rights, and Peaceful Coexistence, 
Professor Leslie Griffin emphasizes the magnitude of John Courtney 
Murray’s ecclesial achievement, namely, moving the Catholic Church 
from its core belief that that “the separation of church and state is clearly 
wrong, an evil to be tolerated and changed whenever it can be,” to an 
understanding of the relationship of church and state that is centered on 
“the freedom of the church, not the establishment of the church.” Central 
to Murray’s position was a recognition—subsequently endorsed by the 
Second Vatican Council—that “the right to religious freedom belongs to 
every human individual, not just to the individual church or just to 
Catholics.” Professor Griffin also points out, however, that “many of 
Murray’s successors, both Catholic and non-Catholic, in courts, 
legislatures, and voting booths, have instead remained overwhelmingly 
committed to their own religious truth instead of to everyone’s religious 
rights.” The upshot of these developments, Professor Griffin argues, is 
that “the state’s actors have empowered church institutions while 
neglecting individuals”—a hypothesis that she tests by reviewing the law 
relevant to employment discrimination, access to contraceptives, and 
same-sex marriage. In each of these areas, religious leaders have 
aggressively taken positions that value the church’s religious freedom 
over that of the individual. According to Professor Griffin, “[t]he law 
protects women’s rights, reproductive rights, and gay and lesbian rights. 
It should be up to individuals, not their church’s hierarchy, to decide 
whether to exercise those rights.” 
In The Right to Religious Freedom—A Theological Comment, 
Professor Hille Haker explains the return of religion into the public 
sphere, attends to the historical context of religious freedom debates, and 
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addresses the contemporary politicization of religion. Exploring the 
complexity that defending the right to religious freedom entails, Professor 
Haker cautions that what “counts as a human rights violation is not 
always easy to discern.” In addressing difficult and often polarizing 
questions in society, such as that of religious freedom, she invites us “to 
listen to all sides” and be willing “to come up with prudent practical 
solutions.” Professor Haker’s paper underscores that human dignity is 
“not a metaphysical concept that relates to a metaphysical order but a 
moral concept that relates to our situated vulnerable agency.” “One of the 
greatest insights of . . . the concept of dignity,” she points out, “is that 
God-given freedom is reflected in the conscience of the moral agent; 
conscience, not the authority of the Church, is the ultimate reference that 
a person must abide by.” Faithfulness to this tradition entails “[c]reating 
a space for everyone in the public sphere, and claiming the rights for those 
who have no rights entails the duty to speak out for the rights of 
others . . . . This ‘preferential option’ for the rights of others . . . in reality 
is a responsibility.” 
In Religious Freedom and the Common Good, Professor Kathleen 
Brady notes that, in the context of ongoing culture wars, “few topics are 
more important to consider than the relationship between religious 
freedom and the common good.” In Professor Brady’s view, too little 
attention has been given to that important relationship. “In some cases, 
the problem has been a narrow focus on one’s own interests and neglect 
of competing considerations. More often, though, the problem has been 
partial understandings of what is, in fact, a complex and nuanced 
relationship.” For Professor Brady, “pursuing religious freedom with the 
common good in mind” means that believers must not focus only on 
protecting their own rights, but “must also consider the effects of their 
demands on others and the larger community.” By the same token, “those 
impacted by the protections religious believers seek must also consider 
the value of religious liberty.” For religious liberty to be pursued in light 
of the common good, Professor Brady argues, “[e]ach side must carefully 
consider what it really needs and not insist upon advantages that are not 
really necessary,” with each side being “willing to address what is most 
important to the other.” Professor Brady believes that “constitutional 
rules regarding the requirements and limits of religious accommodation 
should foster such compromises.” She also believes that the 
“considerable power” that religious conservatives wield in the Trump 
Administration provides an opportunity for religious leaders who “have 
followed the same well-worn paths focused on protecting their own 
rights” to refocus their efforts on the common good, “reaching out to 
others of good will to try to overcome some of our society’s deepest 
divisions.” 
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In From Common Good to Convivencia: Religious Liberty and the 
Cake Wars, Professor Carmen Nanko-Fernández examines the central 
relationship between theological and legal constructs related to religious 
freedom and inaccurate interpretations of religious texts and theological 
traditions that bear on legal arguments. Professor Nanko-Fernández’s 
paper emphasizes that, “Theological discrepancies and biblical 
interpretations are not the concern of the courts, as the Supreme Court 
articulated in 1871 in Watson v. Jones.” On the other hand, she notes that, 
“Attention to the theological details is necessary . . . on the part of our 
churches and religious entities who participate in these cases by filing 
amicus briefs and/or by adding to the rhetoric around highly charged 
neuralgic and contested issues like same-sex marriage.” Professor 
Nanko-Fernández’s paper invites a more just, comprehensive, and 
accurate consideration of religious freedom and religious traditions, one 
that avoids dichotomous treatments of sacred and secular subjects (e.g. 
LGBT persons as secular versus those who do not accept same-sex 
marriage as religious). In so doing, she questions whether we might be 
using the courts “to engage in ecumenical and interreligious debates that 
belong in another sector of the public square.” 
Finally, taking Section 16 of the Virginia Declaration of Rights as his 
fundamental text, Professor Thomas Berg argues in his essay, Religious 
Freedom and Nondiscrimination, that “nondiscrimination is a crucial 
component of religious freedom,” but that “religious freedom is also a 
value independent of nondiscrimination, and the two sometimes come in 
conflict.” Professor Berg begins by discussing the nondiscrimination 
principle. Among other things, Berg discusses the Supreme Court’s 
willingness to inquire into the motivation of the Colorado Human Rights 
Commission in determining that the baker was the object of antireligious 
animus, while refusing to look into President Trump’s antireligious 
motivation in Trump v. Hawaii. He argues that, “[i]t is unfair to accuse 
the Court’s majority [in Trump] of rank hypocrisy,” but “the Trump 
majority certainly failed in an important opportunity to give teeth to the 
basic constitutional principle against official religious bigotry.” “To 
preserve religious freedom as a principle, not a tool, we must enforce it 
for all,” Professor Berg argues. He then emphasizes that 
nondiscrimination does not exhaust the concept of religious freedom: 
“Equality is little comfort without a baseline guarantee of actual freedom; 
equality alone could mean equal suppression of all religions.” Noting the 
tension between these two values, Professor Berg then suggests an 
approach aimed at protecting both sides. Applying that model to the facts 
of Masterpiece Cakeshop, Professor Berg concludes that the baker must 
win because “[t]he harm of regulation on the religious side is permanent 
loss of identity or permanent loss of occupation,” which is “far greater 
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than the one-time dignitary harm on the couple’s side.” 
As all these papers make clear, the need for reasoned conversation in 
the area of religious freedom has never been greater. The authors’ 
arguments, we hope, may promote greater clarity and literacy with 
respect to both legal and religious matters that affect the protection of 
religious freedom as a fundamental human right. Through ongoing 
conversation with diverse stakeholders, we hope that public consensus 
may emerge—a new American consensus, if you will—that responds to 
“the signs of the times” and addresses the need for just and well-informed 
legal decisions, carefully weighing the right of religious freedom with the 
concerns of particular persons, institutions, and the voices of those who 
defend equally fundamental human rights within our democratic society. 
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